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NOTES
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW: DOES IT WORK ATOLL?
Martin D. Gelfand*

I. INTRODUCTION
BETWEEN SEPrEMBER 5, 1995 and January 24, 1996, France undertook a new round of nuclear testing in the South Pacific at the Mururoa

Atoll, a ring-shaped coral island surrounding a lagoon in French Polynesia.' France started testing nuclear weapons in the Pacific in 1966, and

prior to this latest round, tested 175 nuclear weapons through 1991.2 The
forty-one tests conducted between 1966 and 1974 were atmospheric, and
the 134 tests conducted between 1975 and 1991 were underground The
latest tests have also been underground
France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific fueled the
flames of worldwide opposition France contends that it is entitled to

* B.A., St. John's College, Annapolis, Md. 1989; J.D. Candidate, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law 1997. The author wishes to thank Professor Henry
T. King, Jr. for his helpful comments and guidance; Shaun O'Connell and Anastasia
Enos for their comments and guidance; his parents, Ernie and Ellie Gelfand; and Nina
Sobel for her committment to the whole endeavor.
See Craig R. Whitney, FranceEnding Nuclear Tests That Caused Broad Protests,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at Al.
2 See Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1995 I.CJ. 288; Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.)
(Application of 9 May 1993), Request for an Examination of the Situation, Brief filed
by Don MacKay, Co-agent of the Government of New Zealand, before the International
Court of Justice, Aug. 21, 1995 [hereinafter New Zealand Brief] (citing 2 J. BoucHEZ
& R. LECOMTE, LEs ATOLLS DE MURUROA Er DE FANGATAUFA 184-89) (on file with

author).
3 See id.
" See Philip Shenon, Nuclear Test Plan Tarnishes France's Image in Pacific, N.Y.

TiaMs, Sept. 1, 1995, at A3.
' See, e.g., id. (reporting condemnation of the tests from New Zealand, Australia,
and Japan); France Conducts Second Nuclear Test in South Pacific, DEUTSCHE PRESsEAGENTUR, Oct. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (reporting U.S.

opposition to the testing as indicated by White House spokesman Michael McCurry
announcing that the United States "regretted" the French tests and "urge[d] all of the
nuclear powers, including France, to refrain from further nuclear tests"); Philip Shenon,
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test the weapons underground at Mururoa because the atoll is on French
sovereign territory.6 National leaders in the South Pacific, however, are
concerned about potential environmental damage to their countries.'
France counters that the testing is safe.' Others are not so sure.9
Since the 1970s, there has been a proliferation of international law
instruments that attempt to address issues such as the French nuclear
testing controversy of 1995-96.'o Using the nuclear testing controversy
as a case study, this Note explores the state of international environmental
law. Specifically, it tracks the international community's progress in
restating transboundary environmental law. It suggests ways to resolve
international environmental law's real-world inadequacies.

Commonwealth Opposes Major on A-Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 7 (reporting
statement issued by the fifty-two nation British Commonwealth at its summit in
Aukland, New Zealand, on Nov. 10, 1995. Although British Prime Minister John Major
was the sole dissenter to the statement, Prince Philip, husband of Queen Elizabeth II,
made the royal family's opposition to the testing known: "There is suspicion that [the
testing is] doing damage. If you're concerned with conservation, you want to make sure
it isn't."); Jane Holligan, Non-Aligned Movement Shifts 'South,' UPI, Oct. 19, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (reporting that the 113-nation NonAligned Movement "strongly deplores nuclear testing" in the Pacific); Big Turnout in
French Anti-Nuclear Protest, REUTER EuR. COMMUNrrY REP., Oct. 15, 1995, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (reporting on the Oct. 14, 1995 demonstration
that drew 10,000 French demonstrators outside France's main submarine base to protest
the testing); Daniel Plesch & Simon Whitby, France's Bomb, Our Problem, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at 19 (stating that "[t]o date, 150 countries have criticized the
underground weapons tests at the Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia that resumed this
month after three years and that are to continue into 1996.").
6 See Thomas L. Friedman, The French Ostrich, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at
A21.
" See, e.g., Shenon, supra note 4 (stating that the promise that France will sign a
comprehensive test ban treaty "has done little to placate the people who live in the
South Pacific nations closest to the test site, and who say earlier nuclear tests there
wreaked havoc with wildlife and human health").
8 See France Carries Out Second Nuclear Test in Current Series, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct.2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. "French nuclear
authorities insist this final series will be environmentally safe .... " Id.
" See, e.g., E.U.: Nuclear Tests - Team of Experts Did Not Have Access to Important Surveillance Systems, Reuter Textline, Oct 18, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File. The team leader of a European Union verification mission
to the Mururoa Atoll reported that his experts did not have access to environmental
monitoring systems and "because of this, it is impossible to give an unreserved view
on the efficiency and adequacy of the overall surveillance system in place." Id.; see
also discussion infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text
o See Part IH.B infra.
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Part II tracks the development of international law models that speak
to the question of how to determine whether one sovereign state is
entitled to injunctive relief when another sovereign state is engaging in
environmentally hazardous activity. Part lI.A discusses the precedent set
in the Trail Smelter Case," a controversy between the United States and
Canada in the 1920s and 1930s that culminated in a landmark 1941
arbitral decision requiring proof of a "cause in fact" before an affected
party could attain relief from an environmentally damaging project." Part
II.B discusses the legacy of a landmark 1970 U.S. statute, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 3 NEPA requires proponents of a
project with a potentially significant environmental effect to conduct
environmental impact assessments and make those assessments available
to the public. 4 As discussed below, the legacies of these two models are
quite different: the 1940s model provides that damages must be proved
while the 1970s model places the burden on the party engaging in the
activity to show that damages will not likely occur, or is the better alternative. 5 Part II.C discusses general trends in international law relating
to this topic, including the proliferation of NEPA-style international agreements.
Part II discusses additional historical and political issues at stake in
the South Pacific. Part IV analyzes the recent controversy in the South
Pacific in light of the 1940s and 1970s models discussed, focusing on the
body of international environmental law that utilizes the 1970s model.
Part IV.A explores how applying the various international environmental
treaties, where possible, should have enjoined France from testing its
weapons, at least until the required environmental impact assessments
were completed under current international law. Part V.B explains why
that did not happen. Part IV.C provides alternatives that may be applicable to another similar situation, should it arise. These alternatives include
using equity principles, customary international law to hold parties to
their obligations, and rethinking the dispute resolution provisions of
international environmental treaties. The rethinking process should include
an examination of recent multilateral trade agreements as an appropriate
model for revising dispute resolution language in international environmental agreements.
Part V concludes by acknowledging the positive impact the 1970s
model treaties have had on international environmental law and encourag-

Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
Id. at 1965.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1990).
See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
"SSee discussion infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
"

12
13
14
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big affected states to be forceful and creative in exercising these treaties
to enforce their requirements on proponent states. Looked at in this light,
affected states in the future may find greater success in exercising their
rights under the many international environmental agreements now in
force or approved for ratification. 6 However, 1970s model treaties are
limited by ineffectual dispute resolution provisions that need to be
reworked to include effective enforcement.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MODELS
A. The 1940s Model: The Trail Smelter Case
One of the first and most important cases in modern international
environmental law is the Trail Smelter Arbitration." A lead and zinc
smelter in the town of Trail, British Columbia, just north of the
Canadian-U.S. border, emitted sulfur dioxide that caused damage to farms
and timber across the border in the United States."s In its final decision
in 1941, the tribunal for the Trail Smelter Case, composed of one judge
each from the United States and Canada, as well as a chief judge from
Belgium,"9 decided that:

i6

See discussion infra notes 173-234 and accompanying text.

Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); see, e.g., Arthur P. Rubin,
Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259, 259 (1971).
"Every discussion of the general international law relating to pollution, starts, and must
end, with a mention of the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and
Canada." Id. See also Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in InternationalLaw Regulating State Responsibility for TransboundaryNuclear Pollution, 12
COLUM. J.ENvTL. L. 203, 208 (1987) (stating that "[any analysis of [foreign] liability
necessarily begins with the landmark Trail Smelter case.").
isTrail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1917-19. Although the case dealt with law and
equity, this Note only considers the equity questions. Article 3 of the Convention for
Settlement of Difficulties from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., 49 Stat. 245 (1935),
T.S. No. 893 (ratified Aug. 3, 1935), set out the questions as follows:
(1) Whether damages caused by the Trail Smelter in the State of Washington has
occurred since the first day of January, 1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid
therefor?
(2) In the event that the answer to the first part of the preceding Question, being in the
affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage
in the State of Washington in the future, and if so, to what extent?
(3) In the light of the answer to the preceding Question, what measures or r6gime, if
any, should be adopted or maintained at the Trail Smelter?
(4) What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of any decision
or decisions rendered by the Tribunal pursuant to the next two preceding Questions?
Id. at 1908. For purposes of this Note, only Question 2 will be considered.
" Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1908 (stating that "[t]he Tribunal shall consist of a
chairman and two national members. The chairman shall be a jurist of repute who is
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[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.'
The Trail Smelter Case introduces the old Roman law concept of sic
utere ut alienum non laedas - one should use one's own property in such
a manner as not to injure that of another" - to modem international
environmental law.' Quoting Professor Eagleton, the tribunal stated, "A
State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts
by individuals from within its jurisdiction." The International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) adopted this principle in the Corfu Channel Case in which
British naval personnel were killed and warships damaged by mines that,
although not traced directly to the Albanian government, were known to
that government.' The I.C.J. thus found Albania liable for damages
under the sic utere principle? The sic utere principle has also been
included in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 601(1)(b):
A state is obligated to take such measure as may be necessary, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities
within its jurisdiction or control ... are conducted so as not to cause
significant injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.
The 1940s model, as articulated in the Trail Smelter case, while
focusing on the sic utere principle, modifies that principle with the
requirement of showing causation2 One problem with the 1940s
neither a British subject nor a citizen of the United States .. .
2
Id. at 1965.
21 See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
' See Jillian Barron, Note, After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under
InternationalLaw, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 653 (1987); Developments in the
Law-InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1492, 1496 (1991) [hereinafter Developments].
2
Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963 (citing C. EAGLETON, THE REsPONSIBILrY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 80 (1928)).
2'

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Merits Judgment of Apr. 9).
Id. at 23.

2

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

24

§ 601 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
' See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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model's causation requirement is that it, in effect, allows one state to

pollute another state up to a threshold at which damage is found.' This
problem inevitably leads to a second problem: determining, in a reliable
manner, what that threshold is.29 Finding causation in general, let alone
in environmental damage claims, is fraught with misunderstanding."

Environmental damages present a special kind of causation problem
because of the time lag between act and injury and uncertainties associated with proof.3 Proof is difficult in environmental injury cases because
plaintiffs are often able to show only a "causal link" rather than "but-for
cause."3 Causation in cases involving delayed pathological injuries such
as nuclear accidents, nuclear testing, and other catastrophic environmental
incidents, are practically impossible unless the effects of the accident are
immediate.33 In U.S. environmental law, tort-type damage claims have
"proved to be a crude mechanism at best for controlling the onslaught of
' Thus, the ability of the 1940s model to resolve
modem-day pollution."34
situations such as that in the South Pacific is limited, where damage has
to be proved, but the risks remain significant.35

28
29

See Rubin, supra note 17, at 281.
See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,

95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1619-22 (1995) (explaining the limits of science in its
ability to determine and assess health risks caused by chemical pollutants).
o See generally Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735,
1737 (1985). "In all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and
yet elusive as the causation requirement, which relieves a defendant of liability if his
tortious conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff's injury." Id. (citations omitted); David
A. Bagley, The United States and International Nuclear Civil Liability, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 497, 575, 576 (1992) (stating that "[tlhere is no facet of the law of tort that
is more elemental, and more often taken for granted in legal analysis, than the requirement of causation in fact.").
31 See Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35
STAN. L. REv. 575, 575 (1983).
32 See id. at 583 n.30 and accompanying text.
" See Bagley, supra note 30, at 576. "The principal culprits are those of indeterminate and indeterminable causes. That is, similar injuries can be caused (albeit less severely) by non-nuclear causes and from radiation from other than nuclear sources, such
as medical treatment and even the sun." See id. at 576 n.341.
3
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 102 (1992).
"5 See discussion infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
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B. The 1970s Model: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
One way to avoid some of the problems of assessing damage after
it happens is to take a proactive approach: assess potential damage of a
project in an attempt to prevent the damage from happening 6 The
1970s model places emphasis on findings in a publicly executed environmental impact assessment before a project actually takes place. The
pioneering piece of legislation requiring an assessment is the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA) 7 On January 1, 1970,
U.S. President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into U.S. domestic law.38
NEPA's declaration of policy states that "it is the continuing policy of
the Federal Government. .. to use all practical means and measures...
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations ... ,"9 Despite such lofty
goals, NEPA's methodology for achieving them is modest. NEPA requires
all federal agencies to include a detailed statement of the environmental

See Carole Klein-Chesivoir, Note, Avoiding Environmental Injury: The Case for
Widespread Use of Environmental Impact Assessments in International Development
Projects, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 517, 517 (1990).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1990).
See PERcWvAL, supra note 34, at 1023.
31 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1990).

80
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impact of any proposed action.' NEPA further requires agencies to
make the detailed statement available to the public."
Unlike other U.S. environmental legislation of the 1970s,42 NEPA
merely requires federal agencies to consider the likely environmental
effects of their projects. The "detailed statement" described in paragraph (C) that assesses the "environmental impact" of a project in subparagraph (i), outlined above, has come to be known in U.S. law as the
Environmental Impact Statement and elsewhere generally as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)." The requirement of public participation in the EIA process, however, is emphatic, and failure to comply with
this requirement could potentially derail a project.45
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1990). Specifically, § 4332(2)(C) requires that
[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall ...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-

(i)
(ii)

the environmental impact of the proposed action,
any adverse environment effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commilments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with [appropriate Federal agencies]. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies which are authorized to
develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President,
the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public . . .and shall accompany the
proposal through the existing agency review process[.]
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1990).
4 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1987); Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Air Act), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1990). These acts erect elaborate regulatory schemes which
Percival contrasts with NEPA as approaches to U.S. environmental legislation of the
1970s. See PERCIVAL, supra note 34, at 767-69, 877-79.
4 PERCIVAL, supra note 34, at 1024.
44 The "detailed statement" is called both Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in the literature. See, e.g., William R.
Mendelsohn, In Camera Review of Classified Environmental Impact Statements: A
Threatened Opportunity?, 23 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 679, 687 (1996). For consistency, this Note will use EIA throughout.
See PERCIVAL, supra note 34, at 109.
NEPA revolutionized environmental policy making not by imposing any substantive
environmental controls, but rather by mandating changes in the decision-making process
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One commentator, William Tilleman, considered NEPA's emphasis
on public participation, outlined six reasons for such emphasis, including:

(1) improving the quality of development decisions through consultation;
(2) empowering the public to participate in conflict resolution; (3) restructuring the way proponents select activities; (4) saving long-term costs by
predicting and avoiding environmental damage; (5) advancing communication and understanding; and (6) providing an agreed-upon procedural
framework.' Tilleman uses, by way of illustration, the hypothetical sce-

nario of a proposed pulp mill.

7

Although the question at law may be

simply whether to approve the project, a broad sample of public input
will help establish priorities that include a broader perspective of the immediate short-term goal in question and other possible alternatives. For
example, issues raised might include whether the government allows the
cutting of timber for feedstock to the mill or whether to preserve the
timber, promote recycling, and enhance the resource base for future
generations.' Tilleman notes, however, that greater public participation
means greater delay, greater costs to run the system, and greater risks.49

of federal agencies. The statute requires agencies to incorporate environmental concerns
into their decision-making by requiring them to perform detailed assessments of the
environmental impacts of, and to consider alternatives to, any "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." While NEPA only
mandated consideration of environmental impacts, Congress soon declared certain impacts
to be presumptively unacceptable when it forbade the taking of endangered species of
fish, wildlife, or plants by enacting the Endangered Species Act in 1973. Once it
became clear that citizens could enforce these requirements in court, they became a
powerful new tool for challenging development projects.

Id.
' William A. Tilleman, Public Participationin the Environmental Impact Assessment Process: A Comparative Study of Impact Assessment in Canada, the United States
and the European Community, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 345-46 (1995).
' Id. at 346-47.
4' Id. at 347.
" Id. at 347 n.33 (citing the Canadian government's environmental assessment policy manual:
Managers often conceive of public consultation as a lofty public enquiry, or at least a
long, costly, risky and foolhardy process. Many believe public consultations create needs
that otherwise would not exist. They trigger a project review process among local
people and force a project's proponents to make undue concessions or changes. We
might know where the process begins but we don't know where it will eventually take
us. It would seem more prudent to try to slide the project by quietly, or to give to the
"soft sell," than to run the risk of a public process which can go out of control or
result in a revision of the initial project "design." These attitudes are not without some
truth. However, for a complete picture, they have to be considered in light of the risks
of not consulting the public).
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Generally, the EIA has become widespread in international agreements, U.N. resolutions, and in the writings of legal scholars."0 One
major multi-lateral treaty that includes the requirement to conduct an EIA
is the Law of the Sea." Article 204 of the Law of the Sea requires that
states, through competent international organizations, "observe, measure,
evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects
of pollution of the marine environment."'2 Article 205 requires that states
"publish reports of the results obtained" in their EJAs, or provide the
reports to the competent international organizations for them to make
available to all states.53 The Law of the Sea was approved on April 30,
1982, by 130 votes in favor, four opposed, and seventeen abstentions.54
The Convention was ratified by the requisite sixty signatories55 when the
government of Guyana deposited its ratification on November 16, 1993.6
The Law of the Sea's approval by the United Nations, even before
its ratification, was an indication that the NEPA principles have made
their way into customary international law. In a case between Tunisia

Klein-Chesivoir, supra note 36, at 525.
SI

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE

LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA at 1, U.N.

Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.85.V.5 (1982) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA].
The treaty entered into force on November 16, 1994. Id.
52 Id. art. 204.
51 See id. art. 205.
" See Louis B. Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments, American University Washington College of Law Edwin A. Mooers Lecture
(Oct. 11, 1984), in 34 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 271 n.2 (1985).
51 See LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 51, art. 308(1) (indicating that sixty "instrument[s] of ratification or accession" were needed for ratification and that the "Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument
of ratification or accession.").
' See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 33 I.L.M.
309 (Jan. 1994).
" Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993,
at 25. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that decisions in accordance with international law shall apply:
a. intemational conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59 [providing that decisions of the Court have no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case], judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

1997]
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and Libya, for instance, the International Court of Justice recognized
language in the Law of the Sea after its approval but before its ratification as text that has codified preexisting principles of international law 8
The I.CJ. explained that it "could not ignore any provision of the draft
convention if it came to the conclusion that the content of such provision
is binding on all members of the international community because it
embodies or crystallizes a preexisting or emergent rule of customary
law. , 9
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties indicates that third party states may be bound by international agreements if
such agreements are recognized as customary international law.' Section
102(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states: "International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to
the creation of customary international law when such agreements are in
fact widely accepted." ' It is more likely that such agreements create
customary international law when the agreement is "multilateral[,] is designed for adherence by states generally, is widely accepted, and is not
rejected by a significant number of important states." 2 Such is the case
with the Law of the Sea: other than the dispute settlement provisions,
most of the environmental protection provisions of the Law of the Sea
now reflect customary international law.63
C. Application of the 1970s Model: Slouching Toward Mururoa
Although sixty-three states have ratified the Law of the Sea as of
February 3, 1994, France has not.' Neither New Zealand, Australia,
Japan, nor the United States have ratified the agreement, though all but
the United States have signed it.' Two other treaties that incorporate the
EIA requirement of the 1970s model do, however, include France among
its signatories: the Noumea and Espoo Conventions. 7
Id. (emphasis added) [hereinafter Statute of the I.CJ.]; see also Sohn, supra note 54,
at 271-72; see discussion infra part IV.B.I.
s'See Sohn, supra note 54, at 278.
S9 Id. (citing the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) 1982 I.CJ. 18, 38. The question of how practices and agreements get
crystallized into international law is further developed in section IV.B.1.
' United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 38
(1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
6, RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 102(3).
62
6

Id. § 102, cmt i.
Id. at pt. V Introductory Note, pt. VI Introductory Note.

' See Status of the Law of the Sea, supra note 56.
6 See id.

' Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the
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1. Noumea
The Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and
Environment of the South Pacific Region was done at Noumea, New
Caledonia on November 25, 1986, and is known as the "Noumea Con'
vention."68
Article 2 of the Noumea Convention states that the
Convention applies to the South Pacific Region "Convention Area" in
or near the Pacific Ocean within 200 nautical miles of the various
signatory states.7" Article 12 states: "The Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention
Area which might result from the testing of nuclear devices."' Article
16 provides for ElAs to be done in accordance with the public access
provisions in NEPA. 2 Article 31 provides for the Convention's entry
South Pacific Region, 26 I.L.M. 38 (Nov. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Noumea Convention];
'6 United Nations
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, 30 I.L.M. 800 (conducted at Espoo, Finland, Feb. 25, 1991)
[hereinafter Espoo Convention].
60 Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 1(1).
69 Id. art. 2.
70 Id. art. 2. The signatories are: Cook Islands, France, Marshall Islands, New
Zealand, Palau, the United States, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, the United
Kingdom, and Western Samoa. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to which the United
States is a Party, 26 I.L.M. 1736, 1736 (Nov. 1987).
7' Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 12.
n Id. art. 16. The text of Article 16 reads in full:
Environmental Impact Assessment
1.The Parties agree to develop and maintain, with the assistance of competent global,
regional and sub-regional organisations as requested, technical guidelines and legislation
giving adequate emphasis to environmental and social factors to facilitate balanced development of their natural resources and planning of their major projects which might
affect the marine resources in such a way as to prevent or minimize harmful impacts
on the Convention Area.
2. Each Party shall, within its capabilities, assess the potential effects of such projects
on the marine environment, so that appropriate measures can be taken to prevent any
substantial pollution of, or significant and harmful changes within, the Convention Area.
3. With respect to the assessment referred to in paragraph 2, each party shall, where
appropriate, invite:
(a) public comment according to its national procedure,
(b) other Parties that may be affected to consult with it and submit comments.
The results of these assessments shall be communicated to the [South Pacific Commission], which shall make them available to interested parties.

Id. (emphasis added); Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1990) (both instruments mandate to
their respective constituencies, inter alia, the publication of analyses of the potential
environmental impacts of proponents' projects, along with ways to minimize or reduce
such effects. Both instruments require the proponents to make the EIAs available to the
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into force upon "the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of at least

ten instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."

The

Noumea Convention entered into force on August 22, 1990.'4
2. Espoo

The "Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context" was done at Espoo, Finland on February 25,
1991, and is known as the "Espoo Convention."75 The Espoo Convention
is a multilateral agreement that codifies the NEPA EIA principles.7 6 Specifically, Article 2 of the Espoo Convention requires an environmental
impact assessment for each of several enumerated activities in Appendix
I.' Nuclear testing is not one of the seventeen enumerated activities'

public).
Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 31(1).
See New Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 37.
7 Espoo Convention, supra note 67.
76 Id. art. 2(2).
" Id. "Each Party shall take the necessary legal, administrative or other measures
to implement the provisions of this Convention, including, with respect to proposed
activities listed in Appendix I that are likely to cause significant adverse transboundary
impact, the establishment of an environmental impact assessment procedure that permits
public participation and preparation." Id.
Id. app. I.
List of Activities
1. Crude oil refineries (excluding undertakings manufacturing only lubricants from
crude oil) and installations for the gasification and liquefaction of 500 tonnes or more
of coal or bituminous shale per day.
2. Thermal power stations and other combustion installations with a heat output of
300 megawatts or more and nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors (except
research installations for the production and conversion of fissionable and fertile
materials, whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kilowatt continuous thermal load).
3. Installations solely designed for the production or enrichment of nuclear fuels, for
the reprocessing of irradiated fuels or for the storage, disposal and processing of radioactive waste.
4. Major installations for the initial smelting of cast-iron and steel for the production
of non-ferrous metals.
5. Installations for the extraction of asbestos and for the processing and transformation
of asbestos and products containing asbestos: for asbestos-cement products, with an
annual production of more than 20,000 tonnes finished product; for friction material,
with an annual production of more than 50 tonnes finished product; and for other asbestos utilization of more than 200 tonnes per year.
6. Integrated chemical installations.
7. Construction of motorways, express roads and lines for long-distance railway traffic
and of airports with a basic runway length of 2,100 metres or more.
8. Oil and gas pipelines.
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Other activities may be treated as such enumerated activities if such
activity is "likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact and
' As of June 11, 1991,
thus should be treated as if it [were] listed."79
twenty-nine states had signed the Espoo Convention." However, Espoo
is not yet in force,"1 as sixteen states have yet to ratify the agreement as
required by Article 18.2 France is a signatory to the Espoo Convention,
though it has not yet ratified the agreement. 3
D. The Trail Smelter Test Applied to Mururoa
The international law theory that arose from the Trail Smelter case
offered injunctive relief from a proponent state only if (1) the consequence of the proponent state's action is serious, and (2) the affected
state can establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was injured."
Part one of the 1940s model test is easily met by evidence brought
forward by New Zealand before the I.C.J. on September 11, 1995.'
New Zealand Attorney General Paul East testified before the I.C.J. that
the noted French volcanologist, Professor Pierre Vincent, who has studied
the Mururoa Atoll, believes that "[a]ll of the factors now known to be6
conducive to destabilisation of volcanoes ... are present at Mururoa."

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Trading ports and inland waterways.
Waste disposal installations.
Large dams and reservoirs.
Large groundwater abstraction activities.
Pulp and paper mills.
Major mining operations.
Offshore hydrocarbon production.
Petroleum, chemical, and petrochemical storage facilities.
Deforestation of large areas.

Id.
79 Id. art. 2(5).

s The signatories as of June 11, 1991, are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Denmark, European EC, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States. See id.
sI See New Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 46 n.84.
'2 Espoo Convention, supra note 67, art. 18(1).
3 See id. For a discussion on the implications with regard to customary international law of France's signing of the Espoo Convention, see discussion infra note 155-68
and accompanying text.
'4 See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941).
s Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 367 (delineating environmental risks
associated with nuclear testing at the Mururoa Atoll).
6 Id. at 367.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1997]

These factors, including major weathering and fracturing of materials, as
well as steep sides, leave Mururoa vulnerable to potential immediate
adverse effects of even one additional underground nuclear explosionY
According to Professor Vincent, "[tihe immediate consequence of such a
destabilisation would be a sudden spill-out of part of the radioactive
"stockpile" into the sea and the formation of a tidal wave - or, more
accurately speaking, a tsunami - which would threaten the lives of those
living not only in Mururoa but in neighbouring archipelagoes."88
Attorney General East also submitted the findings of Dr. Colin
Summerhayes, the Director of the Institute of Oceanographic Sciences in
the United Kingdom, who stated that, "[v]olcanic islands like Mururoa are
inherently unstable and may fail, given an appropriate trigger like an
earthquake or a very large explosion. Failure is likely to cause a giant
submarine landslide that may demolish parts of the island and could
create a tidal wave that may itself damage coastal installations on the
other islands nearby."89 Dr. Summerhayes also stated that the creation of
such a tidal wave was "a general threat to coasts as far away as New
Zealand and Australia." However, the second test of the 1940s model
cannot be met without the showing of actual injury to the affected
state. 9' Thus, part two of the 1940s model test will not be met unless
the catastrophes foreseen by Professor Vincent and Dr. Summerhayes
actually occur and are shown with "clear and convincing evidence."'
III. A LOOK AT THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT FROM AN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PERSPECTIVE
A. Nuclear Test Cases Revisited
In discussing the transition from the 1940s model to the 1970s
model, it is appropriate to mention the Nuclear Test Cases in which New
Zealand and Australia sought to enjoin France from testing nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere at Mururoa. 3 In 1974, the I.C.J. "ducked the
issue" 4 by dropping the case against France when France announced that
it was going to stop atmospheric testing.95 However, France did not stop
7

Id.

'SId.
9Id.

9 Id.

9 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941).
9
See id.
9'See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.CJ. 288; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1974 I.CJ. 457; (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253.
94 Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 259, 265-66 (1992).
9' See id. (explaining that New Zealand and Australia complained that states have
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testing, but merely switched to underground testing.' France continued
to test underground through 1991 and resumed its testing in 1995.'
New Zealand reopened its 1974 case against France upon France's
1995 decision to resume testing. Since France terminated its recognition
of the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction in 1974, New Zealand could not
merely file a new cause of action." Instead, New Zealand's case was
based on paragraph 63 of the I.C.J.'s 1974 decision, which provides that
"if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the applicant could
request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions
of this Statute." New Zealand argued that the basis of the I.C.J.'s
judgment is affected because new information had emerged that showed
the environmental hazards of the underground tests are more dangerous
and immediate than was previously known."
On September 22, 1995, the I.C.J. again ducked the issue by ruling
narrowly that the basis of its 1974 decision was not affected, holding that
the 1974 decision "dealt exclusively with atmospheric nuclear tests.''.
France announced in 1974 that it would stop conducting atmospheric
tests. Since New Zealand's "objective [had] in effect been accomplished,"
with respect to stopping the atmospheric testing, the I.C.J. ruled that "the
object of the claim [has] clearly disappeared [and therefore] there is
nothing on which to give judgment."'" In order for the basis to change,

a right to be free from the hazardous increased radiation due to fallout from the
atmospheric testing that France was conducting at Mururoa Atoll). France conducted its
last atmospheric test in 1974 and switched to underground testing starting in 1975. See
id. When France publicized its decision to cease atmospheric testing, the I.CJ. dropped
the case. See id. "Press statements do not often have legal effect at international law,
but this one did." Id.
' See New Zealand Brief, supra note 2 (indicating that after 1975 all tests were
conducted underground).
' See id.; see also discussion supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
9' 1973-74 I.CJ. Y.B. 49.
' New Zealand v. France 1, 1974 I.CJ. at 477.
'0 1995 I.CJ. at 367-68.
01 Id. at 306. The court noted that in the 1974 case, "the Court reached the conclusion that Judgment dealt exclusively with atmospheric nuclear tests [and that] consequently, it is not possible for the Court now to take into consideration questions
relating to underground nuclear tests .... " Id. at 306. "[Ihe Court cannot, therefore,
take account of the arguments derived by New Zealand, on the one hand from the conditions in which France has conducted underground nuclear tests since 1974, and on the
other hand from the development of international law in recent decades - and particularly the conclusion, on 25 November 1986, of the Noumea Convention .....
Id.
'02 Id. at 305.
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ruled, France would have to once again test atmospheric weapthe court
10 3
ons.

B. A Proliferationof Paper Instruments
In its brief to the I.C.J., New Zealand cited the Noumea Convention
and France's obligations thereunder.' Specifically, New Zealand cited

Article 16, which delineates the Convention's signatories' obligation to
perform an EIA.0 5 New Zealand also cited Article 12, requiring signatories to "take all appropriate measures to "prevent, reduce and control

pollution in the Convention Area which might result from the testing of
nuclear devices."'" New Zealand argued that "this reference to nuclear
testing does not exclude such activity from the clear duty expressed in
Article 16 to carry out an [EIA]."'' 7 New Zealand also cited several
other international agreements to show that conducting ElAs is required

by customary international law "in relation to any activity which is likely
to cause significant damage to the environment, particularly where such
effects are likely to be transboundary in nature.""1 ° These agreements,
all requiring ElAs where applicable, include the United Nations Environ-

mental Programme Draft Principles of Conduct;

°

the United Nations

Law of the Sea;". the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources; the 1985 European Community Envi-

3

d. at 305-06.

See New Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 36-44.
See Noumea Convention, supra note 66 (citing art. 16 in full); see also New
Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 37 (also citing art. 16 in full).
' Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 12.
76.
'o New Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 38,
'o'

"os

'o

Id. at 44, [ 89.

o Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States, U.N. Environment Programme, UNEP Doc.
GC.6/CRP.2, reprinted in 17 LL.M. 1091 (1978). Principle 4 states:
States should make environmental assessments before engaging in any activity with
respect to a shared natural resource which may create a risk of significantly affecting
the environment of another State or States sharing that resource.
Id. at 1098 (citations omitted).
110 See LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 49, at 73.
.. See ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
Kuala Lumpur July 19, 1985, reprinted in 2 SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN
THE FIELD OF THE ENViRONMENT 343 (Iwona Rummel-Bulska & Seth Osafo eds.
1991). Article 14(1) provides that parties conducting activities "which may significantly
affect the natural environment conduct an assessment of their consequences . . . . " Id.
at 347. Article 20(3) requires parties "to make environmental impact assessment before
engaging in any activity that may create risk of significantly affecting the environment
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ronmental Assessment Directive; 12 the 1989 World Bank Operational
Directive;" the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty; 4 the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity; 5 and
the 1991 Espoo Convention." 6
In 1992, there were approximately 885 different environmentally
oriented legal instruments,"17 compared with less than three dozen such
instruments in 1972.1 One commentator, in assessing the instruments
that have been proliferating over the last twenty years, noted: "Although
these treaties are indisputably impressive in intellectual achievement and
praiseworthy in effort, it can readily be seen that the treaties will only be
effective if applicable everywhere or nearly everywhere, on a largely
unconditional basis."" 9 Another commentator, critiquing the EIA requirements, notes:
A duty to inform mandates nothing; it provides no guidance about
whether and how pollution source states should alter their behavior in
light of new information. Adherence to duties of prior assessment and
disclosure will scarcely reduce transboundary pollution. Thus, the shift
to procedural obligations renders compliance with international law
inconsequential for actually protecting the environment.'20
Professor McDougal recognized that traditional approaches to international law have "ranged from the view, at one extreme, that international
law is not law at all but mere rules of international morality [to] the
other extreme, that international law dictates the concept of national
law..'' Professor McDougal sought a more central position: a "world
public order which maintains an appropriate creative balance between the

or the natural resources of" the other parties to that agreement. Id. at 348.
12 See Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 1985 OJ. (L 175) 40.
,13 See World Bank Operational Manual, OD 4.01 (1991).
114 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties: Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty
Special Consultative Meeting, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (Oct. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Antarctic
Treaty].
"' United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (June 5, 1992) [hereinafter Convention on Biodiversity].
116 Espoo Convention, supra note 67.
"7
See EDrrH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BAsIC
INsTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES ix (1992).
"' See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 675 (1993).
", Bagley, supra note 30, at 537 n.174.
2
Developments, supra note 22, at 1513.
2
Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A

Policy-oriented Perspective, 4 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 25, 27 (1959).
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inclusive, shared competence of the entire community of states and the
exclusive, non-shared competence of particular states .... .""2 Each
state, Professor McDougal argues, has "a double interest in such inclusive
competence.""
Analogizing the McDougal principle to the situation in the South
Pacific and other potential situations, we begin to see the problem that
New Zealand and other states face with respect to international environmental law. The inclusive, shared competence is reflected in a group of
states that share a common marine system. This group acknowledges that
by signing regional and global treaties that recognize, as articulated in the
Noumea Convention, "the special hydrological, geological and ecological
characteristics of the region which requires special care and responsible
management."' 24 The exclusive, non-shared competence reflects the
sovereignty of each individual state and the basic responsibility of each
of them to protect its territory and population."
On the one hand, if international law is to mean anything, it is in
the application, not in the "indisputably impressive... intellectual
achievement and praiseworthy ... effort"' of its publicists. On the
other hand, this impressive body of work represents the efforts of scholars, politicians, and activists who drafted, negotiated, and lobbied for their
states' signatures and ratification. As such, it can serve as an important
set of tools that, taken together, can be skillfully and effectively implemented. The following section discusses how two such instruments, the

'1

13

Id.
Id.

at 26.

Noumea Convention, supra note 66, at pmbl.
"2 See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1919 (1941). It is worth

124

noting that the claims made by the United States against Canada in the Trail Smelter
Case were primarily those of private U.S. citizens complaining of damage and injury
caused by a private Canadian corporate "citizen." Id. Yet the United States did not sue
Canada on behalf of those citizens, at least not outright. Rather, the United States took
action to protect its sovereign rights. The arbitral tribunal recognized this relationship:
The controversy is between two Governments involving damage occurring in the
territory of one of them (the United States of America) and alleged to be due to an
agency situated in the territory of the other (the Dominion of Canada), for which
damage the latter has assumed by the Convention an international responsibility. In this
controversy, the Tribunal is not sitting to pass upon claims presented by individuals or
on behalf of one or more individuals by their Government, although individuals may
come within the meaning of "parties concerned" . . . and of "interested parties" . . .
and although the damage suffered by individuals may, in part, "afford a convenient
scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State."
See id. at 1912-13 (citing Judgment No. 13, Permanent Court of Int'l Justice, Series A,
No. 17, at 27-28).
" Bagley, supra note 30, at 537 n.174.
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Noumea and Espoo Conventions, may be merged to result in a powerful,
but limited, effect.
IV.

CAN SOUTH PACIFIC STATES PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM
RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION?

A. Merging a "Do" Treaty with a "How-To" Treaty
Did New Zealand or other South Pacific states have forums other
than the I.C.J. to voice their dispute with France over the resumption of
nuclear tests at the Mururoa Atoll? Though the I.C.J. refused to address
the issue, the 1970s model, as codified in the various treaties outlined
above, is theoretically equipped to address situations such as those faced
by New Zealand and its neighbors." Although it would be far outside
the scope of this Note to look at the hundreds of instruments" that
incorporate the 1970s model into their codification of international law,
two of these instruments, the Noumea and Espoo Conventions, are
instructive in an analysis of how the 1970s model might be applied to the
situation at hand.'29

Any discussion of implementation and enforcement of a treaty must
begin with the principle from Roman law of pacta sunt servanda (agreements of the parties must be observed).'30 This principle "embodies a
widespread recognition that commitments publicly, formally and (more or
less) voluntarily made by a nation should be honored..'.' Pacta sunt
servanda was codified into the United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties at Vienna on May 22, 1969, and was entered into force in
1981."' Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states: "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith."'3
The Noumea Convention was not specifically geared toward ElAs,
but rather to protect the environment of the South Pacific, particularly,

'1

See discussion infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.

23

See discussion supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
See generally Noumea Convention, supra note 67; Espoo Convention, supra note

67.
"0 See 1973-74 I.CJ. Y.B. 49.
131 Id.
132 Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 26.
1

Id.
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that of the defined Convention Area.' The requirement for EIAs 35
was just a part of the overall objective of the Noumea Convention. Other
than the requirement for conducting ELAs, as described above in Article
16, the Noumea Convention gives little guidance as to how EIAs are to
be conducted.'3 6 While New Zealand accurately described in its brief to
the I.C.J. what France's responsibilities were, the Noumea Convention
itself does not specify, for instance, what should be included in an EIA,
or what procedures are prescribed for executing compliance with Article
16's requirements. 37

The Noumea Convention may be described as a "Do" treaty, mandating that the parties do protect the environment of the Convention Area." 8 Among the items that the Noumea Convention requires France to

do, as described above, is to prevent pollution from nuclear testing as
delineated in Article 12: "The Parties shall take all appropriate measures
to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention Area which

might result from the testing of nuclear devices." '39 The Mururoa Atoll
is part of French Polynesia which is described in Article 2 as part of the
Convention Area.Y As discussed in Part II.B, ELAs provide a means of

preventing some of the problems associated with proof of causation after

1

See generally, Noumea Convention, supra note 66, at pmbl (providing goals such

as preserving traditions and cultures in the South Pacific, recognizing the "hydrological,
geological and ecological characteristics of the region," seeking harmonious resource
protection and development, etc.).
" See Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 16.
136 See id.
" Id. (providing the full text of a fairly bare-boned call to signatories of the
Noumea Convention to conduct EIAs but providing very little guidance as to what is
supposed to be in an EIA and what procedural methodology is to be followed for
ensuring the public notification requirements are met).
". See Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 6 (requiring parties to prevent
pollution from vessels); id. art. 7 (requiring parties to prevent pollution from land-based
sources); id. art. 8 (requiring parties to prevent pollution from sea-bed activities); id.
art. 9 (requiring parties to prevent pollution from atmospheric discharges); id. art. 10
(requiring parties to prevent pollution from waste disposal activities); id. art. 11
(requiring parties to prevent pollution from toxic and hazardous waste storage); id. art.
12 (requiring parties to prevent pollution from nuclear testing); id. art. 13 (requiring
parties to prevent pollution from mining and dredging operations); id. art. 14 (requiring
parties to protect endangered species of flora and fauna); id. art. 15 (requiring parties
to prevent pollution during emergency response operations). Id.
,39Id. art. 12.
" See generally id. (including French Polynesia in the list of states to be included
in describing the "convention area").
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an environmental injury has occurred. 4' By taking a proactive approach,
ElAs assess potential damage of a project to prevent the damage from
happening. 42 Therefore, to comply with Article 12 of the Noumea Convention, France is required to submit an EIA as prescribed by Article 16.
The Noumea Convention anticipates its own procedural, or "HowTo" gaps. 43 Article 4 of the General Provisions, encourages further
international law-making by providing that the "[p]arties shall endeavor to
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements ...
for the protection,
development and management of the marine and coastal environment of
the Convention Area" consistent with the Noumea Convention.'" Article
5 encourages parties to formulate and adopt "other Protocols prescribing
agreed measures, procedures and standards to prevent, reduce and control
pollution form all sources . . . ."" It also requires the parties to "establish and adopt recommended practices, procedures and measures to
prevent, reduce and control pollution" in cooperation with competent
international organizations.'" It follows, therefore, that the drafters foresaw that the Noumea Convention instrument alone would not be sufficient
to carry out its stated goals and that further agreements, protocols, and
procedures would be required.
What is needed, therefore, is a "How-To" instrument that provides
further guidance on how to comply with, among other things, the EIA
requirement of Article 16 of the Noumea Convention. As international
environmental instruments go, the Espoo Convention fits the bill. The
Espoo Convention was developed with the specific purpose of creating a
system "to give explicit consideration to environmental factors at an early
stage in the decision-making process by applying environmental impact
assessment, at all appropriateadministrative levels, as a necessary tool to
improve the quality of information presented to decision makers
"147

The Espoo Convention begins, as does the Noumea Convention, with
a goal-oriented declaration: "The Parties shall ... take all appropriate and
effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities."'" The
'4'

42

See discussion supra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 36-63; see also Klein-Chesivoir, supra note 36, at

517.
"'4See

discussion infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
Convention, supra note 66, art. 4(1).

'44 Noumea

Id. art. 5(3).
Id. art. 5(4).
" Espoo Convention, supra note 67, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
4s Id. art. 2(1).

"4

'4
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Espoo Convention continues by articulating the requirement for an
EIA, 49 referring the reader to Appendix I which lists the EIA's content
requirements.' Article 3 covers notification provisions, requiring that
the proponent state notify all potentially affected states and engage in "effective consultations" with such states.' It also requires that the notification include any information on the proposed activity's possible
transboundary effect, the nature of its possible decision on the matter, and
a reasonable time to respond to the notification." Article 3 also sets up
action requirements for the affected parties and other concerned parties.' In sum, where the Noumea Convention dedicated three short
paragraphs to EIA requirements, the Espoo Convention is dedicated to
both the substantive provisions of an environmental protection instrument
and the procedural requirements of the EIA. The Espoo Convention,
therefore, provides the procedural, or "How-To" fillers for the Noumea
Convention's gaps." 4
B. Roadblocks on the Highway to Espoo
That the Espoo Convention is not yet in force is not in itself a
problem, as signatories to international agreements are "obliged to refrain
155
from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement."'
Thus, even though Espoo is not yet in force, its terms oblige its signatories, France included.
The bigger problem for New Zealand and other South Pacific states
is that they are not signatories to the Espoo Convention.' As noted
above, there are hundreds of international environmental instruments in

Id. art. 2(2).
Id. app. XII. Content requirements include: (a) description and purposes of the
proposed activity; (1) description of resonable alternatives; (c) description of environment likely to be affected; (d)description of the potential environmental impact; (e)
description of mitigation measures to minimize impacts; (f)relevance and reliability of
data used; (g) uncertainties; (h) measurement and monitoring requirements; and (i) nontechnical summary with visual presentation as appropriate. Id. Compare note 72, supra
(text of the Noumea EIA requirement) with note 41, supra (text of NEPA EIA
"o
's

requirement).

...Espoo Convention, supra note 67, art. 3(1).
'52

Id. art. 3.

153 Id.

See discussion supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 312(3); see also Vienna Convention, supra note
60, art. 1.
'" See supra note 80.
'u

155
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effect today. 5 7 Generally, it behooves a state to know what these instruments are, what is contained in them, and whether it is to its tactical and
strategic advantage in a given or anticipated situation to sign such an instrument. If, for example, New Zealand was a signatory to both the
Noumea and Espoo Conventions, as is France, then New Zealand could
more easily make the case that France is accountable for both the substantive requirements of Noumea and the procedural requirements of
Espoo.58 Generally, international agreements are "binding upon the
parties to it ... ."59
On the other hand, in circumstances where successive international
agreements are made, the Restatement of Foreign Relations articulates the
following formula:
Section 323. Successive International Agreements ...
(2) When all the parties to the earlier agreement are also parties to the
later agreement, the earlier agreement applies only to the extent that its
provisions are compatible with those of the later agreement.
(3) When the parties to the later agreement do not include all the
parties to the earlier one,
(a) as between states parties to both agreements the rule in
Subsection (2) applies;
(b) as between a state party to both agreements and a state party
to only one of the agreements, the agreement to which both states are
parties governs their mutual rights and obligations."
Thus, it could be argued that only the Noumea Convention governs the
mutual rights and obligations of both France and New Zealand and that
the Espoo Convention does not apply.
Notwithstanding the fact that the I.C.J. refused to consider whether
France violated Article 16 of the Noumea Convention,' France argued
before the court that it complied with Article 16, but was under no
obligation to comply with the Espoo Convention. 62 Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut, Director of Legal Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign
'5

See discussion supra notes 104-26 and accompanying text.

"

See generally discussion supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (explaining

the Roman pacta sunt servanda concept). Pacta sunt servanda "lies at the core of the

law of international agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 321, cmt. a.
9 RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 321.
'c Id. § 323.
6 See note 101 and accompanying text.

,62
See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) (English translation of Verbatim Record of Sept.
12, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.) at 64-74 [hereinafter Verbatim Record] (on file with author).
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Affairs, testifying before the court, correctly noted, "Despite its name,
'impact assessment,' this type of measure leaves each State, including
under the [Noumea] treaty arrangements, with a considerable discretion as
to how it ensure, before undertaking potentially dangerous activities, that
the effect of such activities on the environment will not be detrimental.' 3 Mr. de Brichambaut argued that "France has from the outset
publicized its testing by circulating details directly to the United Nations,"' noting, however, that "France, like other nuclear powers, has
to classify some information, but this does not make the test safety data
any less credible. 65 Mr. de Brichambaut criticized New Zealand "citing
pell-mell provisions of conventions not yet in force, such as the Espoo
Convention ... to produce a massive effect and convince the Court of
the existence of a particularly dense and binding corpus juris necessarily
implying recourse to a concept" of a structurally rigid codification of EIA
procedure." In conclusion, Mr. de Brichambaut argued:
Even though we have willingly demonstrated the precautions taken
by France, which, as the Court has seen, are supported by widely circulated scientific data, it still remains that international law recognizes no
ecological exception in the matter of evidence. Environmental law, like
other fields of law, obeys the well-known principles of actori incombit
probatio [proof rests on the plaintiff], and therefore New Zealand must
base its allegations on something other than the worst-case scenarios
encouraged by the undeniable talent of its counsel. Specifically, in
connection with damage that can be equated with transboundary damage,
so often found where the environment is concerned, the International
Court of Justice in its Judgment in the Corfu Channel case rejected the
plea of self-evidence and we do not believe that international law on
this point has changed. 67
The French Legal Affairs Director thus summarized his argument by
raising the fundamental issue in the broader context of environmental law:
does international environmental law embrace the 1940s model or the
1970s model?" His position is that the 1940s model, requiring the
plaintiff to show damages, is controlling. New Zealand,, on the other

6

Id. at 68.

'" Id. at 73.

Id.
Id. at 67; see also New Zealand Brief, supra note 2, at 44-49 (discussed supra
notes 108-16 and accompanying text, summing up New Zealand's argument about
customary environmental law that Mr. de Brichambaut is refuting).
'6 Verbatim Record, supra note 162, at 73-74.
165

'"

'

See discussion supra notes 17-63 and accompanying text.
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hand, follows the 1970s model, asking the court to show deference to the
preventative EIA concept that has been appearing in the more recent
international environmental instruments. As noted, the I.C.J. did not
address this issue, but instead focused narrowly on the procedural question of whether it was authorized to review any French nuclear testing
other than the atmospheric testing that was at issue in the 1974 decision.169 The remainder of this Note focuses on how, if at all, a state in
a situation similar to that of New Zealand can attempt to enforce
France's, or any other state's, obligation under 1970s model international
environmental agreements.
C. The Road Ahead: Creative Next Steps for InternationalEnvironmental
Treaties
1. Equity Principles
Interestingly, New Zealand and other South Pacific states probably
are not eligible to sign the Espoo Convention. Article 16 of the Espoo
Convention provides that the agreement "shall be open for signature...
by States members of the Economic Commission for Europe [E.C.E.] as
well as States having consultative status with the pursuant to paragraph
8 of the Economic and Social Council resolution 36 (IV) of 28 March
1947 .. .. 170 Paragraph 8 of that resolution provides for admission "in
a consultative capacity, European nations not Members of the United
Nations." '' Although New Zealand participates in some E.C.E. sessions
in activities of concern, such as telecommunications, "on the basis of the
wording and referencing in Article 16 of the Espoo Convention, this level
of participation does not appear to be sufficient enough to constitute
consultative status," according to Warren Fraser, an attorney for the New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who participated in the
second round of nuclear test cases between New Zealand and France."7
The Noumea Convention, to which both France and New Zealand are
parties, includes a vague EIA requirement that is open to the discretionary
interpretation of any party so interested.'73 The Espoo Convention, however, which could potentially rein in a given party's discretion with some
See discussion supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
170 Espoo Convention, supra note 67, art. 16.
', E.S.C. Res. 36 (IV), U.N. Escor, at 10(8), U.N. Doc.
E/402 (1947).
" Memorandum from Warren Fraser, Legal Division, New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, N.Z. to Martin Gelfand 1 (Jan. 29, 1996) (on
file with author).
173 See discussion supra notes 163-71
and accompanying text.
'
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of the firm procedural requirements anticipated in the Noumea Convention, 74 is out of bounds to New Zealand.7"
Restatement section 322(2) binds a party to an international agreement with respect to its entire territory.

6

Since France's testing was

being conducted on its sovereign territory" and France a is signatory
to both the Noumea and Espoo Conventions, it follows that France is
bound by both the requirement to complete an EIA under Article 12 of
Noumea 78 and by the more stringent EIA procedural requirement under
Espoo.'79 However, the Espoo Convention confers "affected party" and
"concerned party" status only on parties to the agreement."s° Since only
European states and the United States are able to attain such status, party
states in the South Pacific are effectively precluded from taldng action
against France under the terms of the Espoo Convention.
One possibility is to try applying equitable principles to the case in
point. One such principle is that of ex aequo et bono, according to equity
and fairness. This principle is articulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice as the power of the Court to decide a case under such
terms if the parties agree thereto.'' The problem becomes obvious
where, as in the case between France and New Zealand, one of the
parties, France, is not a party to the I.C.J. statute"8 and the other party,
New Zealand, is not a party to the agreement in dispute.' France need

'

'
176

See discussion supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 322(2).

'7 Friedman, supra note 6.
' Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 12.
'7 See discussion supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
" See Espoo Convention, supra note 67, at 804:
4. The Party of Origin shall, consistent with the provisions of this Convention, ensure
that affected Parties are notified of a proposed activity listed in Appendix I that is
likely to cause significant adverse transboundary impact.
5. Concerned Parties shall, at the initiative of any such Party, enter into discussions
on whether one or more proposed activities not listed in Appendix I is or are likely to
cause a significant adverse transboundary impact and thus should be treated as if it or
they were so listed. Where those Parties so agree, the activity or activities shall be thus
treated ....
Id. The Definition section defines "Parties" as the contracting parties. Id. at 803. An
"Affected Party" refers to a "party," i.e., a contracting party, "likely to be affected to
the transboundary impact of the proposed activity." Id. "Concerned Parties" are the
party conducting the activity "and the affected Party of an environmental impact

assessment pursuant to this Convention." Id
' Statute of the I.CJ., supra note 57, at 25.
2

1973-74

I.CJ. Y.B. 49.

" See discussion supra notes 143-56.
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not agree to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J., while New Zealand is barred
from participation in ex aequo et bono by virtue of its non-party status.
Professor Michael Reisman described equity as "the complex of
inclusively prescribed goals, which are rarely formulated in peremptory
and conventional legal terms, yet which condition all authoritative decision. The most craftsmanlike legal decision that controverts these goals,
though faultless and regular by the criteria of a narrowly conceived
discipline, is nevertheless 'splendidly null."" 84 Without reliance on an
equity principle such as the one Professor Reisman articulates, New
Zealand is effectively precluded from pressing its complaint against
France.
The problem for New Zealand is that of fundamental unfairness.
France is permitted to act in a manner in its colonial territory that would
be precluded in its motherland by the terms of the Espoo Convention. In
Europe, any other signatory to Espoo could enjoin France from testing
nuclear weapons. But in its territory in the South Pacific where there are
no parties to Espoo, France is free to do as it pleases with impunity
under the terms of the Espoo Convention.
In a 1988 seminar on equity in international law moderated by
Professor Sohn, the issue was raised that "[i]nterpreting the law to reflect
justice opens the inquiry to such a broad range of choice that it invites
the [International Court of Justice] to exercise power arbitrarily. Justice is
such an elusive notion ... .""1 Professor Louis Sohn responded:
I might agree with you, but the Court does not. In the Tunisia-Libya
Case"s the Court started by saying: "equity as a legal concept is a
direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task it is by
definition to administer justice, is bound to apply it." Of course, the
word justice is part of the name of the Court - International Court of
Justice .... The parties that established the Court felt it should be a
court of justice, not a court of ossified law."
"Ossified law" might be a good way of describing the 1940s model that
the I.C.J. upheld in the second nuclear test case between New Zealand
and France. 8 By refusing to consider France's alleged breach of the
,"

W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NuLLrrY AND REVISION 560 (1971).
Seminar, Equity in International Law, 82 AM SOC'Y INT'L PRoc 277, 283.
" See discussion supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (citation added by
5

author).

Seminar, supra note 185, at 283 (quoting Professor Louis Sohn).
See, e.g., supra note 170 (French legal affairs director defending actori incombit
probatio principle that, like the Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel cases, required a polluter to discharge beyond some threshold that could only be found out through
18

18
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Noumea and Espoo Conventions, the I.C.J. seemed to take a different
tack than the one it took in the 1982 Tunisia-Libya Case. 9
2. Espoo as Customary International Law to Which France is Bound
Even without signatory status, New Zealand can show that the
procedural requirements of the Espoo Convention have become customary
international law by virtue of their widespread acceptance under the
Espoo Convention itself."9 It was noted above that concepts codified in
the Law of the Sea crystallized into customary international law despite
their not being put into force through a formal ratification process. 9'
The Restatement of the Law (Third) of Foreign Relations recognizes three
ways for a rule of international law to be accepted by the international
community of states: through international agreement, by derivation from
general principles common in the world's legal systems, and through
"customary law."'" The Restatement further notes, "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."'93 The drafters explain that
"[finternational agreements constitute practice of states and as such can
contribute to the growth of customary [international] law.' 94
By way of example, the drafters cite the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases. 9 There, the I.C.J. observes that Article 6 of the Vienna Convention states that "[e]very State possesses the capacity to conclude treaties."" Drawing from that principle, the court inquiries as to whether
a treaty, so concluded, created customary international law:
In so far as the contention is based on the view that Article 6 of the
Convention has had the influence, and has produced the effect, described, it clearly involves treating [the treaty term] as a norm-creating
provision which has generated a rule which, while only conventional or
contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as

litigation, rather than the more proactive 1970s-style environmental protection instruments that have tended to replace the actori incombit probatio policies of the past); see
discussion supra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
"'

See discussion supra notes 184-85.

'9

See discussion supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 102(1)(a)-(c).

19

'

, Id. § 102(2).
Id. § 102, cmt. i.
t Id. (citing (F.R.G. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3).
'
Vienna Convention, supra note 60, § 6.
"9

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[VCol. 29:73

to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do
not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this
process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it
constitutes indeed one of the recognised methods by which new rules of
customary international law may be formed. At the same time, this
result is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained."9
Sir Ian Sinclair distills this rendering into a three-part test: (1) Is the
treaty term "of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be
regarded as the basis of a general rule of law?"; (2) was there widespread
participation in the development of the term?; and (3) is there evidence
of extensive state practice? 98 Sinclair draws the conclusion that international agreements can, with qualifications, generate international environmental law binding on non-parties.'99
The Espoo Convention has been signed by twenty-nine party states
or international organizations, reflecting a multilateral character of the instrument.' Moreover, larger-scale treaties such as the Law of the Sea
with 130 votes in favor and more than sixty ratifications have adopted
EIA requirements."fl The popularity of the EIA provisions serves as
evidence of the "norm-creating character" of the instruments.' Extensive state practice of EIA provisions is reflected in the fact that major
industrial nations, including the former Soviet Union, Germany, France,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States all have domestic laws
requiring EIAs in their domestically enacted bodies of law.' Thus,
using the Sinclair test' and the Restatement Section 102 standard,'
a 1970s model EIA instrument such as the Espoo Convention is the type
of international agreement that can become customary international law,
capable of creating both obligations and rights for non-parties.'
3. Dispute Procedures

'9

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and Nor.), 1969 I.CJ. 41 (Feb. 20).

191

SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIEs 22 (2d

ed. 1984). Cf., RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 102, cmt. i (citing similar provisions
noted supra note 63).
'9
SINCLAIR, supra note 198, at 23.
See Espoo Convention, supra note 80 (referring to list of signatories).
201 Sohn, supra note 54, at 271 n.2.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 198, at 22.
See Klein-Chesivoir, supra note 36, at 525.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 198.

See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 26, § 102, cmt. i.

Cf. id. § 324(1) ("An international agreement does not create either obligations
or rights for a third state without its consent.").
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Both the Noumea and Espoo Conventions set out procedural requirements for dispute resolution. Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Noumea
Convention provides that if two parties in dispute cannot settle the
dispute between themselves, "they should seek the good offices of, or
jointly request mediation by, a third Party." Once the parties determine that they cannot settle the dispute through negotiation and mediation, they may, if both parties agree, submit to arbitration under conditions set up in the Annex on Arbitration.m5 The problem is that arbitration is not mandatory.' Paragraph 2 of Article 26, however, does provides that if the parties are not able to settle the dispute under the provisions of Paragraph 1, they are not absolved "from the responsibility of
continuing to seek to resolve [the dispute] by means referred to in
paragraph L " ' Thus, while the Noumea Convention does not mandate
arbitration, parties to the treaty maintain an obligation to continue to
mediate the dispute. The Espoo Convention is similar to the Noumea
Convention, except that there is no explicit requirement for the parties to
continue mediating." ' Nevertheless, neither is there explicit permission
for the parties to break off mediation.2 2 Moreover, the pacta sunt
servanda principle, codified into international law through the Vienna
Convention, requires states' commitments to be honored." 3
Other 1970s model international environmental agreements suffer
from the same problem: non-mandatory dispute resolution provisions. The
Antarctic Treaty," 4 for instance, requires that activities in Antarctica "be
planned and conducted on the basis of information sufficient to allow
prior assessments of, and informed judgments about, their possible
impacts on the environment."21 5 Article 8 provides guidelines for doing
so.21 6 Article 18 of the Antarctic Treaty calls for parties to a dispute, "at

See Noumea Convention, supra note 66, art. 26(1).
See id. Paragraph 2 refers to the set of eleven articles on arbitration set out in
the Annex on Arbitration. See id. art. 26(2).
m See id. art. 26(1). "If the Parties concerned cannot settle their dispute through the
means mentioned in paragraph 1, the dispute shall, upon common agreement, except as
may be otherwise provided in any Protocol to this Convention, be submitted to
arbitration under conditions laid down in the Annex on Arbitration to this Convention."
Id. Nothing in the Annex on Arbitration requires either party to submit to arbitration.

Id.

See id.
See Espoo Convention, supra note 67, art. 15(1).
212 Id.
213 See discussion supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
21 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 114.
210
211

215
216

Id. art. 3(2)(c).
id. art. 8.
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the request of any one of them, [to] consult among themselves as soon as
possible with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation,
inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful
means to which the parties to the dispute agree."2 7 While Articles 13,
19, and 20 offer guidelines for parties to go about the dispute resolution
procedures, there is nothing in the language of the treaty that requires
parties to do so.2
Similarly, the Convention on Biodiversity requires
each party to conduct "environmental impact assessment[s] of its proposed
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity . ..
Such a provision, applied to the current nuclear test
case, would allow New Zealand to try France in absentia before a
tribunal, but has no provision for enforcing compliance with any decision
that such a tribunal might make.' Likewise, nothing in the dispute resolution provisions of the Law of the Sea requires a state to actually enter
into dispute resolution procedures."
Recent multilateral trade resolutions provide a better dispute resolution model from the perspective of enforcement. The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), for instance, provides punitive measures,
including monetary fines and suspension of benefits under the treaty,
against a state that fails to comply with its obligations.'m GATT, however, does not require environmental impact assessments for projects
likely to have a detrimental environmental effect. Like GATT, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides punitive measures for
failure to comply with its provisions.' Unlike GATT, NAFTA recog-

217 Id.
218
219

art. 18.
Id. arts. 13, 19, 20.
Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 115.

See id. art. 27.
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails
to defend its case, the other party may require the tribunal to continue its case and to
make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before rendering its final decision, the arbitral
tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is well-founded in law.

Id.
2

LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 51, at 97-104.

m Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

Negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 333 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
' See The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements Between the Government of the
United States of America, The Government of Canada, and the Government of the
United Mexican States, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.
13, 1993, pt. 5, art. 36, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA File. Article 36 provides for
the suspension on benefits under NAFTA for parties that fail to pay a monetary en-
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nizes the relevance of the environmental impact assessment: although the
agreement itself does not establish the requirement, it calls for the Commission for Environmental Cooperation to "consider and develop recommendations with respect to... assessing the environmental impact of
proposed projects . . .likely to cause significant adverse transboundary
effects ....

.224

Combining the 1970s model international environmental treaties with
trade agreements, where possible, could be one way of working out the
impasse that some states might find themselves in, should they be party
to both types of agreements with appropriate and applicable provisions for
enforcement of dispute resolution procedures. A more likely scenario is
for treaty drafters and negotiators to work better enforcement provisions
into the dispute resolution sections of the international environmental
treaties. While vague enforcement provisions have been the model of
choice in the past with respect to international environmental treaties, 2'
the multilateral trade agreements may have paved the way for greater
openness to the possibility of greater enforcement power for environmental treaties.
Requiring an EIA does not necessarily stop a project. However, that
is not the purpose of an EIA. Rather, an EIA is designed to disclose full
information to the public and help decision-makers, with participation by
the informed public, to make more environmentally protective, and
politically stable decisions. Still, the sheer number of instruments in
force give flexibility to affected states that seek injunctive relief from
proponent states. 7 Gaps in one instrument may be filled by applicable
details in another. But international environmental treaties need to be
enforceable. Trade sanctions such as those included in GATT and
NAFTA can be drafted into international environmental treaties to provide
affected and potentially affected states the ability to enforce the treaties.

forcement assessment within 180 days after the assessment is imposed by an arbitral
panel set up to resolve disputes under the agreement. Id.
214 Id. art. 10(7).
' See, e.g., Developments, supra note 22, at 1551 (explaining that international
environmental agreements, like other international agreements, purposely limit the scope
of treaties to reserve power for their own state and to increase the probability of

ratification).
See discussion supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
n See discussion supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATY PROLIFERATION

The 1970s model can be seen as a procedural tool for affected states
to assert their will against a proponent state. The proliferation of environmental instruments seems to evidence a growing and deep-seated concern
of the world's populace.
A major problem with many international environmental treaties on
the books today is that they lack the teeth necessary for a relatively small
state, or coalition of small states, to enforce their provisions on larger,
more economically or militarily powerful states. This problem is illustrated by the recent dispute between the militarily powerful France and
relatively smaller states of New Zealand and Australia. Thomas Friedman
of the New York Times, perceptively described the South Pacific conflict:
What the French, who have no environmental movement, have totally
missed is the development elsewhere in the world of a concept of
environmental sovereignty. Environmental sovereignty says my home,
my space, isn't just limited to my borders on a map. It includes the air
I breathe, the water off my shore and the whole food chain upon which
I rely. Environmental sovereignty is not confined either by borders or
conventional time. That is, the French say there is no danger of the
Mururoa Atoll fracturing and leaking massive radiation that has been
trapped in volcanic rock beneath it from 139 French underground tests
since 1975. Well, maybe there is no leakage today, but what about in
50 years? 200 years?'
The will that a potentially affected state attempts to assert through
application of the 1970s model, therefore, can be seen as an attempt to
assert its sovereignty: namely, its ability to control events on its territory
in a strategic and immediate sense. The model, and its intended application, are articulated in such instruments as the Noumea and Espoo
Conventions. However, France, too, in testing its weapons on its territory
in the South Pacific, is exercising sovereignty.
Under the current scheme of international environmental agreements,
the smaller states can show that the more powerful states are required,
politically and morally, to come to the table under the auspices of an
arbitral panel of their choosing. But in actuality, the more powerful states
can choose to ignore their political and moral obligations because the
enforcement provisions are not effective. These provisions merely ask that

' Thomas L. Friedman, The Bomb and the Boomerang, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27,
1995, § 4, 15.
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proponent states to participate in good faith and do not impose economic
sanctions for failure to participate.
As the 1990s fade into the twenty-first century, the 1970s model has
become the political and moral paradigm for international environmental
protection. The fact that instruments such as the Noumea and Espoo
Conventions, along with hundreds of other similar agreements, are actually being negotiated and ultimately adopted by sovereign points to the
positive direction of environmental protection in an international context.
France's status as signatory to the Noumea and Espoo Conventions
indicates the willingness of the French polity, if not the current political
leadership, to adapt to current and future global environmental needs. And
New Zealand's willingness to exercise its will to apply these instruments,
even if unsuccessful this time, shows that the 1970s model of international environmental law has made its way beyond the theoretical stages.
However, these agreements are using an ineffective boiler-plate textual
model in their dispute resolution sections. To ensure the 1970s model is
truly adopted under international law, treaty drafters and negotiators need
to adopt the dispute resolution language of recent multilateral trade
agreements such as GATT and NAFTA. This would put the necessary
enforcement mechanisms into otherwise useful and effective treaties.

